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RAWLINGS V. KENTUCKY: MORE ON UNPOISONING
THE FRUIT OR SHALL WE JUST PLANT
ANOTHER TREE?
The fourth and fifth amendments to the Constitution are designed
to protect individual rights.1 The fourth amendment protects a person
against unreasonable searches and seizures.2 The fifth amendment pro--
tects a person against compelled self-incrimination.3 Both state and
federal courts insure protection of the fourth and fifth amendment
rights by enforcing exclusionary rules.' Exclusionary rules allow a
court to suppress evidence that law enforcement officials obtain in
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights.' The fourth' and
I See L. TRIBE, American Constitutional Law 3-4 (1978) (Bill of Rights thought
necessary in addition to separation and division of powers to preserve individual rights).
U. S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides, in pertinent part:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated..."
U. S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides, in pertinent part:
"No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself..."
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-77 (fifth amendment prohibits use of
custodial statements made without informing defendant of his fifth amendment rights) reh.
denied 385 U.S. 890 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (fourth amendment prohibits use
of evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment) reh. denied 368 U.S. 871 (1961). See
generally Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV.
665 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Oaks].
5 Oaks, supra note 4, at 665.
" See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961). The principal objective of the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct by removing the incentive
to violate an individuals fourth amendment rights. See Maguire, How to Unpoison the
Fruit-The Fourth Amendme t and the Exclusionary Rule, 55 J. CRmi. L.C. & P.S. 307,308
(1964); Oaks, supra note 4, at 668-72; Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio At Large in the Fifty States,
1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 334-35; Note, The Fourth Amendment and Tainted Confessions Ad.
missibility As a Policy Decision, 13 Hous. L. REv. 753, 754 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Tainted Confessions]. The fourth amendment exclusionary rule originated from dictum in
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). Note, Criminal Procedure-Fourth Amend-
ment Exclusionary Rule -Miranda Warnings Do Not Per Se Render Admissible A Confes-
sion Following an Arrest Which Violates Fourth Amendment Rights, 25 EMORY L.J. 227,
228 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Miranda Warnings]. In Boyd, the Supreme Court suggested
for the first time that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment should be in-
admissible in a federal court. The suggestion lay dormant for thirty years before becoming
law in the federal courts in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). The Court ex-
tended the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure to state authorities in
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949). The Wolf Court, however, failed to impose the ex-
clusionary rule as a means of enforcing the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. Id. at 33. In 1961, the Court applied the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to the
states, describing the rule as an "essential part" of the fourth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961). See generally Miranda Warnings, supra (history of fourth
amendment exclusionary rule); Oaks supra note 4, at 667-68 (same).
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fifth7 amendment exclusionary rules are based on distinct interests
and policies. The fourth amendment exclusionary rule deters law en-
forcement officers from making unconstitutional searches and seizures
by requiring the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment In contrast, the fifth amendment exclusionary rule
deters police from intimidating a suspect into making an incriminating
statement by requiring the police to inform the individual of his fifth
amendment rights in order to make a statement admissible at trial.'
The United States Supreme Court has recognized two exceptions to
the fourth and fifth amendment exclusionary rules.10 Under the first ex-
ception, the independent source rule, evidence tainted by a constitu-
tional violation is admissible if the prosecution can prove that the police
also obtained the evidence from a source independent of the constitu-
Although the Mapp Court held that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule was based
on the Constitution, the Court may have since removed the rule's constitutional foundation.
Without discussing Mapp, the Supreme Court later declared in United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) that the rule is a judicially created remedy. Accord United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1975). Justice Brennan wrote vigorous dissenting opinions in
both Calandra and Peltier, in which he attacked the Court's "strangulation" of the exclu-
sionary rule. Justice Brennan considered both opinions to be inconsistent with 61 years of
fourth amendment jurisprudence. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 551 (1975) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 360 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-78 (1966). Miranda warnings protect an in-
dividual against the compulsion to speak inherent in custodial surroundings. Miranda re-
quires that prior to interrogation police must inform the person in custody that he has a
right to remain silent and that anything he says may be used against him in court. Id. at
467-69. The police must also inform the person in custody that he has the right to consult
with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if he cannot
afford a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent him. Id. at 469-73.
' See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). The fourth and the fifth amendment ex-
clusionary rules apply to all evidence, both direct and indirect, that the police obtain as the
result of a constitutional violation. See 3 W. LAFAVE. SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 11.4 (1978 & Supp. 1980) [hereinafter cited as W. LAFAVE]. Direct
evidence is evidence that the police obtain initially during the constitutional violation. Id. at
612. See also Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CAL.
L. REv. 579, 579 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Revisited]. Indirect evidence is evidence which
the police discover as a result of the evidence initially seized in violation of the constitution.
W. LAFAVE, supra at § 11.4: Revisited, supra at 579. An example of indirect evidence that
police obtain by violating the fourth amendment is a confession which follows an illegal ar-
rest. The indirect evidence that police obtain as a result of a constitutional violation is often
referred to as "fruit of the poisonous tree." See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341
(1939). The fruit of the poisonouse tree doctrine, however, is not limited to cases in which
there has been a violation of the fourth amendment. The doctrine also applies to lineups con-
ducted in violation of the sixth amendment, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239-43
(1967), as well as to confessions obtained without Miranda warnings in violation of the fifth
amendment. United States v. Cassell, 452 F.2d 533, 541 (7th Cir. 1971).
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-77 (1966); see note 7 supra.
10 See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920); Miranda Warnings, supra note 6, at 230-31.
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tional violation.11 The second exception, the attenuation doctrine, allows
courts to admit constitutionally tainted evidence if the causal connec-
tion between the evidence and the constitutional violation is sufficiently
remote, so that the taint, in effect, has dissipated. 2 Since there are
distinct policies behind the fourth and fifth amendment exclusionary
rules, 3 the attenuation determination is particularly difficult for courts
to make when the evidence in issue is a confession made following a
violation of the confessor's fourth amendment rights. The Supreme
Court first addressed the claim that courts should exclude statements
made by the defendant as fruits of a fourth amendment violation in
Wong Sun v. United States.4 Since Wong Sun, the Supreme Court has
considered the admissibility of a confession that follows a fourth amend-
ment violation in three cases, Brown v. Illinois," Dunaway v. New
York, "' and Rawlings v. Kentucky."
In Wong Sun, federal narcotics agents illegally arrested James Wah
Toy without probable cause." The agents broke down the door to Toy's
laundry and pursued him down the hall, finally arresting Toy in a rear
bedroom where his wife and child were sleeping.'9 Immediately after his
arrest, Toy made statements to the agents that implicated him in the
sale of narcotics." Toy's statements also led the agents to Johnnie Yee,
" The independent source exception is traceable to Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). Miranda Warnings, supra note 6, at 231 n.18. The Court in
Silverthorne Lumber held that a fact is not "sacred and inaccessible" even if the police have
uncovered the fact in violation of the fourth amendment, provided that the prosecution also
gains knowledge of the fact from an independent source. 251 U.S. at 392. A good example of
an application of the independent source test is the Supreme Court's holding in United
States v. Crews, 100 S. Ct. 1244 (1980). In Crews, the police unlawfully took a robbery
suspect into custody. Id. at 1247. The police questioned and photographed the suspect and
later released him. Id. A robbery victim identified the suspect's photograph as that of her
assailant. Id. at 1247-48. The police again took the suspect into custody and the victim iden-
tified him at a lineup. Id The victim repeated her identification in court. Id. The courtroom
identification contributed to the defendants conviction for armed robbery. See id. The
Supreme Court ruled that the courtroom identification of the defendant should not be sup-
pressed as the fruit of his illegal arrest because the police's knowledge of the defendant's
identity and the victim's independent recollection of the defendant antedated the unlawful
arrest and were therefore untainted by the constitutional violation. Id at 1250-51.
"2 The attenuation doctrine originated in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
Miranda Warnings, supra note 6, at 231 n.19. The Nardone Court pointed out, in dictum,
that although a defendant may always be able to demonstrate that the evidence which the
prosecution used against him is somehow related to a constitutional violation, at some point
the connection becomes so weak that the taint has, in effect, dissipated. 308 U.S. at 341.
" See notes 6 and 7 supra.
" 371 U.S. 471 (1963); see text accompanying notes 18-33 infra.
, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); see text accompanying notes 34-51 infra.
16 442 U.S. 200 (1979); see text accompanying notes 52-61 infra.
1' 100 S. Ct. 2556 (1980); see text accompanying notes 62-82 infra.
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from whom the agents seized an ounce of heroin.2 Yee claimed that he
had purchased the heroin from Toy and another man known to Yee only
as "Sea Dog."' Toy identified "Sea Dog" as Wong Sun and directed the
agents to a dwelling where'the agents arrested Wong Sun.' Several
days after his arrest, Wong Sun voluntarily returned to the station for
questioning at which time he gave the agents a written confession. 4 At
trial, the prosecution relied heavily on Toy's oral statements and Wong
Sun's written confession.25 The federal district court convicted Toy, Yee,
and Wong Sun of violating federal narcotics laws."
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held that the ar-
rests of both Wong Sun and Toy violated the fourth amendment because
the officers made the arrests without probable cause.Y The Supreme
Court focused on voluntariness in determining whether the lower court
had improperly admitted Toy's and Wong Sun's statements.' The Court
held that the lower court erred by admitting Toy's statement because
Toy's response was not a sufficiently voluntary act to purge the taint of
the fourth amendment violation.' The Court held, however, that the ad-
mission of Wong Sun's confession was proper." The Court reasoned that
21 Id at 474-75.
Id. at 475.
u Id at 477.
Id. at 467-77.
Id. at 470-71. The Wong Sun defendants were convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 174
(repealed 3 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(2), (4) (1970)) which prohibited knowingly importing any narcotic
drug into the United States or receiving, concealing, buying, selling or in any manner
facilitating the transportation, concealment, or sale of any such narcotic drug. Under § 174,
proof of possession was sufficient to convict a defendant unless the defendant could satisfac-
torily explain the possession. Id In Wong Sun, the Court of Appeals noted that a war-
rantless arrest was improper unless the arresting officer had "probable cause" within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. 288 F.2d 366, 370 (9th Cir. 1961). Police arrested both
Toy and Wong Sun without probable cause. Id. A tip from an informant led officers to Toy's
laundry. Id. There was no evidence that the informant was reliable or had ever supplied
reliable information. Id
Police arrested Wong Sun because of Johnnie Yee's statement that he had obtained
narcotics from Wong Sun and Toy. Id. The prosecution made no showing that Johnnie Yee
was a reliable informer. Id. Although a tip from a reliable informant may constitute prob-
able cause for arrest, Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1958), the reliability of the
tip must be determined on the facts of each case, see Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
162 (1925) (tip acceptable in, light of the facts and circumstances within the officers
knowledge). Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court had properly ad-
mitted Toy's statement and Wong Sun's confession into evidence. 288 F.2d at 371.
371 U.S. at 479, 491.
Id at 486, 491.
Id Toy made his statements after several officers broke down the door and followed
Toy into a bedroom where his wife and child were sleeping. Id at 474.
" Id. at 491. Although the decision in Wong Sun predated the decision in Miranda v.
Arizona, 385 U.S. 436 (1966), the agent in Wong Sun did inform the defendant of his right to
withhold information and of his right to the advice of counsel before Wong Sun made his
statement. 371 U.S. at 476.
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Wong Sun had confessed only after he had voluntarily returned for ques-
tioning." The Court concluded, therefore, that Wong Sun's confession
was within the attenuation exception to the fourth amendment exclu-
sionary rule.2 Although the Wong Sun Court focused on voluntariness
as a determining factor in the attenuation analysis, the Court failed to
set forth adequate criteria for determining when a statement must be
excluded to protect the individual's fourth amendment rights.
In Brown v. Illinois, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue of
the admissibility of a confession that follows a fourth amendment viola-
tion.' In Brown, detectives acting without probable cause arrested the
defendant for murder." The officers took Brown to the police station, ad-
ministered Miranda warnings, and questioned Brown about the
murder. After about two hours of questioning, Brown implicated
himself in the crime. 7 Later the same evening, a state attorney'repeated
the Miranda warnings and questioned Brown a second time.' At trial,
the prosecution relied on Brown's responses to both the police and the
state attorney and the jury found Brown guilty of murder. 9 On appeal,
the Illinois Supreme Court held that the Miranda warnings had broken
the causal connection between Brown's illegal arrest and his subsequent
statements, and affirmed Brown's conviction."
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held that Miranda
warnings alone would not always break the causal connection between
the fourth amendment violation and a defendant's subsequent state-
ments.41 The Brown Court noted that the deterrent effect of the fourth
8' 371 U.S. at 491.
Id. See note 12 supra (discussing attenuation exception).
= See Note, Admissibility of Confessions Made Subsequent to an Illegal Arrest:
Wong Sun v. United States Revisited, 61 J. CRIM. L. 207, 209 (1970). Since the facts of Wong
Sun provide two extreme examples of the attenuation problem, the decision provides little
guidance in making the attenuation determination. Toy's statement under the cir-
cumstances was clearly not voluntary. See note 29 supra. Wong Sun's confession, coming
several days after arrest upon his return to the station was clearly voluntary. See 371*U.S.
at 491 and text accompanying note 31 supra.
u 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
' Id. at 592. In Brown, the brother of the murder victim gave the police Brown's name
as an acquaintance of the victim, not as a suspect. Subsequently, police broke into and sear-
ched Brown's apartment without a warrant. After searching the apartment the police
waited for Brown to come home. When Brown arrived he was met inside the apartment by
an officer with a drawn gun. The officer informed Brown that he was under arrest. The ar-
resting officers testified that they arrested Brown for questioning as part of a police in-




Id. at 596. One of the detectives testified as to the contents of Brown's first state-
ment, but the prosecution did not place the writing itself into evidence. Id. The prosecution
introduced and read the second statement to the jury in full. Id.
'0 Illinois v. Brown, 56 Ill.2d 312, 317, 307 N.E.2d 356, 358 (1974).
1 422 U.S. at 603.
1981]
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amendment exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted if Miranda
warnings were held sufficient to purge the taint of a fourth amendment
violation.42 Miranda warnings do not inform a person of his fourth
amendment rights, particularly the right to be released from unlawful
custody following an illegal arrest. 3 The Court further observed that
allowing Miranda warnings to purge the taint of fourth amendment
violations would encourage police officers to violate fourth amendment
rights, and then use Miranda warnings to cure the taint of the fourth
amendment violation."
Brown held that courts should decide whether a statement following
a fourth amendment violation is admissible on a case by case basis."5 The
Court noted that Miranda warnings and voluntariness are the threshold
requirements in determining admissibility. 6 Beyond these threshold re-
quirements, the Court identified as relevant factors the temporal prox-
imity of the arrest and confession, 7 the presence of intervening cir-
42 Id. at 602.
I& at 601 n.6.
" Id. at 602.
,5 Id. at 603.
4 Id.; see note 7 supra (discussion of Miranda warnings). If the police fail to give
Miranda warnings, the court may suppress the statement solely on fifth amendment
grounds without conducting the Wong Sun attenuation analysis. 422 U.S. at 606, n.1 (Powell,
J., concurring in part).
,1 422 U.S. at 603. In enunciating the factors that are relevant in the attenuation
analysis, the Brown court relied on a number of lower court decisions. Id. at 603-04 n.n.8,9,
& 10. The first factor is the temporal proximity of the arrest and confession. The cases that
the Supreme Court relied on indicate that the temporal factor alone does not establish at-
tenuation. In Hale v. Henderson, police illegally arrested the defendant and questioned him
intermittently for 42 hours until he confessed to a murder. 485 F.2d 266, 267-68 (6th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 930 (1974). The Sixth Circuit reversed his conviction because
there was no break in custody between the illegal arrest and the confession, and also
because the confession followed the arrest by only 42 hours. 485 F.2d at 268, 269.
The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of temporal proximity in United States v. Owen,
492 F.2d 1100, 1106-07 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 965 (1974). Owen was under in-
vestigation for mail fraud when the police stopped him and illegally searched his car. The
police found a revolver and charged Owen with possession of a gun by a convicted felon.
While the police detained Owen on the possession charge, a postal inspector told Owen that
Owen was a suspect in the mail fraud investigation. After being released from detention,
Owen returned to the inspector's office to discuss the mail fraud charge. The Fifth Circuit
held that the prior arrest had not tainted Owen's later statement. Id. at 1106. Owen is
distinguishable from Hale because in Owen, unlike Hale, the police released the defendant
from custody and the defendant made the statement only after he had voluntarily returned
for questioning.
The Third Circuit has also held that a significant time lapse together with intervening
circumstances may purge the taint of an illegal arrest. Pennsylvania ex rel. Craig v.
Maroney, 348 F.2d 22, 29 (3d Cir.) reh. denied 352 F.2d 30 (1965), cert. denied 384 U.S. 1019
(1966). In Maroney, police illegally arrested the defendant and held him in connection with a
murder. Id. at 28-29. The defendant confessed, but only after police informed him of his
rights, permitted him to meet with counsel, and took him before an alderman. Id. at 29-30.
The Court held that the confession was admissible on the basis that five days had elapsed
between the arrest and confession, no confession was given prior to appearing before the
alderman, and the defendant had met with his attorney. Id. at 30-31.
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cumstances"8 and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official
misconduct.49 Applying these factors in Brown, the Supreme Court noted
that Brown's statement was separated from his illegal arrest by less
than two hours, there was no intervening event of significance, and the
police officers purposefully had violated the defendant's fourth amend-
ment rights."0 The Court held, therefore, that the lower court erred by
admitting Brown's statements into evidence.51
In Dunaway v. New York, the Supreme Court again focused on the
issue of whether a fourth amendment violation excessively tainted a
subsequent confession.52 The facts in Dunaway were almost identical to
those in Brown." Acting without probable cause, police arrested
" 422 U.S. at 603, 604. The Brown Court's reference to Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.
356 (1972), suggests that immediate presentation of the defendant before a magistrate is a
sufficient intervening circumstance to attenuate a subsequent confession from a fourth
amendment violation. In Johnson, police took the defendant before a magistrate after his il-
legal arrest. A robbery victim identified Johnson in a lineup. Johnson contended that the
lineup identification was the fruit of his illegal arrest. Id. at 365. The Supreme Court held
that the identification was admissible because the police had conducted the lineup under the
authority of the magistrates commitment and not through exploitation of the illegal arrest.
I&.
"9 422 U.S. at 604. The Brown Court relied on United States ex rel. Gockley v. Myers,
450 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1971) cert denied 404 U.S. 1063 (1972). In Gockley, police used an in-
valid warrant to arrest the defendant for check forgery and detained him for several days.
450 F.2d at 234-35. The police actually arrested Gockley because of his suspected involve-
ment in the disappearance of two persons. While Gockley was illegally detained, police in-
terrogated him and obtained statements that the prosecution relied on to secure his convic-
tion for murder. Id. at 233-35. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals excluded the confession in
order to protect Gockley's fourth amendment rights, holding that purposeful misconduct by
the police required the court to exclude the statements even if Gockley's statement was
voluntary. Id. at 237.
In United States v. Edmons, the F.B.I. had arrested four suspects on a federal charge
of failure to have their selective service cards in their possession. 432 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.
1970). The real purpose of the arrest, however, was to enable F.B.I. agents to identify the
suspects as participants in an earlier assault. The defendants subsequently were convicted
of assault on the basis of an in court identification. The Second Circuit held that the iden-
tification was inadmissible because the Government had exploited the illegal arrests. Id. at
584.
The Brown Court also noted United States v. Kilgen, 445 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1971) as a
case where police misconduct apparently was not purposeful. 422 U.S. at 604 n.9. In Kilgen,
police arrested the suspects for vagrancy and discovered a large number of postage stamps
in the trunk of one defendant's car. At the police station, after Miranda warnings, one of the
defendants confessed to theft of the stamps. 445 F.2d at 289. The defendant who confessed
later challenged his conviction as unconstitutional because the Supreme Court had subse-
quently held that the vagrancy statute was unconstitutional. The defendant claimed that
the unconstitutional vagrancy statute made his prior arrest and detention illegal. Id. The
Kilgen Court held that the defendants' arrest and detention were not automatically in-
validated absent some showing that the police lacked a good faith belief in the statutes
validity. Id.
422 U.S. at 604-05.
Id. at 605.
12 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
w Id. at 218; see note 54 infra and text accompanying notes 35-39 supra (facts in
Brown).
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Dunaway for murder." After Miranda warnings, Dunaway made in-
criminating statements and drew sketches implicating himself in the
crime.55 The trial court denied Dunaway's motion to suppress the sket-
ches and statements and subsequently convicted him of attempted rob-
bery and felony murder." The New York Appellate division affirmed
Dunaway's conviction.5 7
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that under
Brown, the state had failed to show that the statements and sketches
were not tainted by the fourth amendment violation.58 The Dunaway
Court reiterated the distinction that the Brown Court had made be-
tween "voluntariness" for purposes of the fifth amendment and "volun-
tariness" under the fourth amendment.5 9 A statement may be sufficiently
voluntary to escape classification as compelled self incrimination under
the fifth amendment and yet not be sufficiently voluntary to break the
causal connection between a fourth amendment violation and a subse-
quent statement.' The Court in Dunaway reasoned that to allow the
defendant's confession into evidence tinder the circumstances of his ar-
rest would permit law enforcement officers to violate the fourth amend-
ment with impunity.8 '
The most recent Supreme Court decision involving the admissibility
of statements tainted by a prior fourth amendment violation is Rawlings
v. Kentucky."' In Rawlings, the defendant was present at the house of a
" 442 U.S. at 203. In Dunaway, an informant told a detective that James Cole had im-
plicated himself and a man named "Irving" in a killing. The informant did not know
"Irving's" last name, but he identified a picture of Dunaway from a police file. Although
Cole later denied being involved in the crime, he did state that he had learned of the killing
from Hubert Adams. Cole claimed that Adams had suggested that Adams' younger brother
and a man named "Irving" committed the crime. Id. at 203, n.1.
s Id at 203.
SId.
'7 61 A.D.2d 299, 402 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1978), reversed, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). On appeal, both
the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals initially affirmed the conviction without
opinion. 42 A.D.2d 689, 346 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1973), affd 35 N.Y.2d 741, 320 N.E.2d 646 (1974).
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded
the case for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court's supervening decision in
Brown v. Illinois. Dunaway v. New York, 422 U.S. 1053 11975); see Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
590 (1974). The Monroe County Court received the case on remand from the New York
Court of Appeals to make further factual findings. People v. Dunaway, 38 N.Y.2d 812,
813-14, 345 N.E.2d 583, 584, 382 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1975). The County Court determined that the
trial court should have granted Dunaway's motion to suppress the challenged evidence. A
divided Appellate Division reversed, holding that the police had not detained Dunaway il-
legally. 61 A.D.2d 299, 302, 402 N.Y.S.2d 490, 492 (1978). The Court of Appeals dismissed
Dunaway's application for leave to appeal. The United States Supreme Court again granted
certiorari to clarify the fourth amendment's requirements for custodial interrogation and to
review the New York court's application of Brown 439 U.S. 979 (1978).
Id at 218-19.
5' Id. at 217; see text accompanying notes 41-44 supra.
o 442 U.S. at 217, 219.
Id at 219.
100 S. Ct. 2556 (1980).
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man named Marquess when police officers arrived with a warrant for
Marquess' arrest.' Upon entering the house, the officers smelled mari-
juana smoke and saw marijuana seeds."4 Two of the officers left to obtain
a search warrant for the premises. 5 The remaining officers detained
Rawlings and the four other occupants of the house, conditioning their
release on consent to a body search." Approximately 45 minutes later,
the officers returned to the house, read the search warrant to the oc-
cupants, and gave the occupants Miranda warnings. 7 The officers
ordered one of the occupants to empty her purse." The purse contained
illegal drugs. 9 The owner of the purse told Rawlings to take what was
his and Rawlings immediately claimed ownership of the substances. 7 An
officer then searched Rawlings, found $4,500 and a knife, and formally
arrested him."'
The trial court denied Rawlings' motion to suppress the drugs and
the money and to exclude the statement that he had made when the
police discovered the drugs. ' Rawlings was found guilty of possession
with intent to sell LSD and of possession of other controlled
substances.73 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed Rawl-
ings' conviction."
On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, Rawlings claimed
that his statement should have been excluded in light of the Brown deci-
sion.7 5 The Supreme Court agreed that Brown was the controlling case. '
I Id at 2559.
CAId.
Id.
Id. In Rawlings, two of the occupants consented to a body search and the police
allowed them to leave. Id Rawlings and two other occupants remained in the house. Id.7 1Id
es Id.
70 Id.
" Id at 2560. In Rawlings, the trial court held that the search warrant for the house
authorized the police to search Cox's purse. Id The trial court reasoned that even if the
search of the purse was illegal, Rawlings lacked standing to object to the search. Id
The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds. See id The appellate
court held that Rawlings had standing to contest the search of the purse. Id. The court held,
'however, that the detention of the occupants and the subsequent searches were legal
because the marijuana smoke and seeds constituted probable cause to arrest all five oc-
cupants. Id.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed, but again on a different basis. According to
the Kentucky Supreme Court, Rawlings lacked standing to protest the search. Rawlings v.
Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d 348, 349 (Ky. 1979), affd 100 S. Ct. 2556 (1980). The court
justified the search of Rawlings' pockets as incident to a lawful arrest which was based on
probable cause. Id
See 100 S. Ct. at 2560.
" Rawlings v. Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d 348, 350 (Ky. 1979).
' 100 S. Ct. at 2562.
6 Id.
1981]
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In applying the Brown factors, the Court noted that Rawlings had
received Miranda warnings immediately prior to making the challenged
statement and that Rawlings had never argued that his admission to
ownership of the drugs was not voluntary." The majority reasoned that
Rawlings' spontaneous reaction to the discovery of the drugs indicated
that the statement was an act of free will unaffected by the unlawful
detention. 8 Considering the short 45 minute time lapse between the ar-
rest and the confession, the majority concluded that in the "congenial at-
mosphere" existing during the detention, the 45 minute span was suffi-
cient to purge the taint.79 The Court did not recognize a significant in-
tervening event between the unlawful detention and the challenged
statement. Examining the conduct of the police, the Court reasoned that
although the conduct may have been improper, the police actions were
not purposeful or flagrant misconduct requiring the exclusion of Rawl-
ings' statement." The Court concluded, therefore, that Rawlings' state-
ment was admissible.
8 1
Prior to Rawlings, lower courts had interpreted Brown as
establishing an inflexible rule for determining whether the prosecution
had purged the taint of a prior fourth amendment violation.2 Under the
inflexible rule, unless the prosecution satisfied all the Brown factors, the
prosecution would be unable to use any statement made after a fourth
amendment violation, even if the officer had committed the violation in
good faith. Where the statement was essential to the prosecution of the
crime, the inflexible rule would shield defendants whose fourth amend-
ment rights had been violated. Although immunity from prosecution for
a defendant whose fourth amendment rights have been violated satisfied
the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule," the inflexible rule
failed to provide for society's countervailing interests in convicting the
guilty criminal.84
Id. at 2562, 2564.
78 Id. at 2563. The dissent in Rawlings disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
Rawlings' admission was "spontaneous." Id. at 2569. (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent
noted that the defendant made his admission in response to Cox's demand that defendant
"take what was his." Id. Cox's statement was the direct product of the illegal search of her
purse. The illegal detention made the search of the purse possible. The dissent concluded
that Rawlings' statements were inadmissible as the fruit of the poisonous tree. Id.
100 S. Ct. at 2563.
Id. at 2564.
81 Id.
I See United States v. Perez Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284, 1289 (9th Cir. 1979); United
States ex rel. Burbank v. Warden, 404 F. Supp. 656, 662 (N.D. Ill. 1975) rev'd 535 F.2d 361
(7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1045, reh. denied 430 U.S. 911 (1977); People v. Martin,
94 Mich. App. 649, 653-59, 290 N.W.2d 48, 51 (1980).
" See Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp
v. Ohio, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 650, 661 (1962); Comment, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree-A Plea
For Relevant Criteria, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1136, 1136-37 (1967).
" See Tainted Confessions, supra note 6, at 754-55 (discussing societal interest involved
in applying the fourth amendment exclusionary rule).
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The Supreme Court's decision in Rawlings demonstrates that courts
should not apply the Brown factors as an inflexible rule in situations
where official misconduct is neither purposeful nor flagrant." The Court
apparently has adopted a flexible application of the Brown factors for
determining admissibility where a statement results from an officer's
commission of a good faith, non-flagrant violation of an individual's
fourth amendment rights." The Rawlings Court, however, leaves a
number of issues unresolved in the fruit of the poisonous tree analysis.
Foremost among these issues are the definitions of "purposeful and
flagrant" misconduct" and "voluntary" statement.8 Moreover, since the
Rawlings Court held that voluntariness alone made a statement admissi-
ble, another unresolved question is whether time lapse89 and the
presence of intervening events" remain relevant factors in the attenua-
tion analysis.
In Brown and Dunaway, the Supreme Court held that where an ar-
rest is made and the arresting officers know that they do not have prob-
able cause, a wrongful purpose is established.9 In contrast, Rawlings in-
dicates that there is no wrongful purpose where officers mistakingly
believe that their actions are within the scope of a search warrant.
2
100 S. Ct. 2556 (1980).
Id. at 2562-64.
See text accompanying notes 92-103 infra.
U See text accompanying notes 104-112 infra.
See text accompanying notes 113-118 infra.
'o See text accompanying notes 119-128 infra.
" Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218 (1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605
(1975). The most controversial factor is the purpose and flagrancy of official misconduct.
Justice Stevens considered flagrancy to be a relevant factor only insofar as the flagrant con-
duct motivated the defendant in making a statement. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
220 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens observed that regardless of the state of
mind of the officer, a fourth amendment violation can induce a statement, and admissibility
should rest on the causal consideration. Id. Justice Rehnquist, however, contended that
given the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule the purpose and flagrancy of police
conduct was the most important factor in the attenuation analysis. 442 U.S. at 226. (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist would require only that police give proper Miranda
warnings and that the statement satisfy fifth amendment voluntariness requirements so
long as police have acted in good faith in a non-flagrant manner. Id.
These conflicting viewpoints on the significance of purpose and flagrancy are based on
different conceptions of the deterrent effect of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. Ac-
cording to Justice Rehnquist, exclusion of a resulting statement where an officer has com-
mitted a violation of fourth amendment rights in good faith serves no useful purpose. Id. at
226. Under Justice Rehnquist's view, exclusion is applied as a substitute for punishment of
an offending officer, and therefore exclusion is only proper where the officer has acted in
bad faith. See id. at 221. Justice Stevens contended, however, that exclusion is not designed
to deter the aberrant individual officer. Id. at 220 (Stevens, J., concurring). According to
Justice Stevens courts exclude illegally obtained evidence in order to motivate the law en-
forcement profession as a whole to adopt and enforce regular procedures that will avoid the
future invasion of the citizen's constitutional rights. Id at 221. If deterrence is aimed at law
enforcement personnel in general, the state of mind of the individual officer has no place in
the attenuation analysis. Id.
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Therefore, it appears that the Supreme Court has based their purpose
inquiry on a subjective analysis of the arresting officers' state of mind.
A purely subjective purpose analysis has the disadvantage of failing
to establish a minimum knowledge requirement to which courts can hold
an arresting officer. A better approach to the purpose analysis is a com-
bined subjective and objective test. A combined subjective and objective
test generates the question whether the arresting officer knew or should
have known that his conduct violated the individual's fourth amendment
rights. 3 Under a combined test, the court could establish a reasonable
minimum level of knowledge concerning an individual's constitutional
rights to which courts could hold the arresting officer. Either an inten-
tional or a negligent violation of the minimum knowledge requirement,
therefore, would create purposeful misconduct. Additionally, a combined
test would permit courts to establish a different minimum knowledge re-
quirement for different members of the police force. For example, courts
could hold detectives to a higher standard of knowledge than the stan-
dard for the officer on the street. Another advantage of a combined sub-
jective and objective test would be that although an officer might claim
an error was made in good faith, if the same officer or an officer in his
department repeated the violation, the court could hold the officer
responsible for knowledge of the rights involved."
A combined subjective and objective test would also be consistent
with the Supreme Court's prior fruit of the poisonous tree decisions. In
Brown and Dunaway, the officers knew that they lacked probable cause
when they made their arrests." In contrast, the officers' conduct in
Rawlings was not clearly unconstitutional and they made the error in
good faith. 6 In Rawlings a conclusion that the officers knew or should
9 See 100 S. Ct. 2556.
" 422 U.S. at 606. (White, J., concurring). The "knew or should have known" formula-
tion of the standard for judging the arresting officer's state of mind is based on Justice
White's conception of the rule in Brown v. Illinois. Id Justice White indicated in Brown that
the fourth and fourteenth amendments require the Court to exclude statements obtained as
fruits of an arrest that the arresting officer knew or should have known he had no probable
cause to make. Id.
" The Court's decision in Rawlings demonstrates the potential application of a combined
subjective and objective test. See text accompanying notes 96-97 infra. While the officers in
Rawlings may have committed their fourth amendment violations in good faith, if the of-
ficers are in a similar situation and again violate a defendant's rights, the claim of good faith
will be unavailable to them. The Court would be doing nothing more than requiring an of-
ficer to learn from his own, or his fellow officers, mistakes.
15 442 U.S. at 218; 422 U.S. at 605.
" See 100 S. Ct. at 2564. The Rawlings majority reasoned that the propriety of detain-
ing a person at the scene of suspected drug activity was an open constitutional question.
The Court also implied that, based on their holding in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979),
the Rawlings officers belief about the scope of their search warrant was improper. 100 S.
Ct. at 2564. Ybarra held that a person's presence near others independently suspected of
criminal activity does not, without more, create probable cause to search that person. 444
U.S. at 91. Application of the Ybarra holding to the facts in Rawlings suggests that prob-
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have known that their conduct violated Rawlings' fourth amendment
rights would have been unreasonable. 7
The Court's analysis of purpose and flagrancy overlap. One type of
flagrancy the Court recognizes is when an officer knowingly violates an
individual's fourth amendment rights. 8 The Court's flagrancy analysis
would be clearer if the Court included this knowledge based flagrancy
under the purpose determination.
The second type of flagrant conduct is conduct that is unnecessarily
intrusive on individual privacy." A flagrancy inquiry based on in-
trusiveness allows a court to decide whether to exclude conduct that is
not purposeful yet highly intrusive on individual privacy. The Supreme
Court's decision in Wong Sun provides an example of this intrusive type
of flagrancy analysis. ' In Wong Sun, the Court excluded statements
when agents improperly believed that they had probable cause for ar-
rest when they broke down the door to Toy's laundry and pursued him
into a bedroom where his wife and child were sleeping.101
A flagrancy inquiry that focuses on the intrusive physical cir-
cumstances surrounding the fourth amendment violation is inadequate
because courts have no standard to determine how outrageous police
conduct must be in order to be "flagrant." A flagrancy inquiry based on
the physical circumstances of the arrest creates a completely open ended
standard. In other contexts, the Supreme Court has described tests
based on flagrancy as ad hoc approaches allowing five Justices sufficiently
revolted by police action to overturn a conviction and let a guilty man go
free.' Moreover, in Mapp v. Ohio, the Supreme Court rejected a flagrancy
test as inadequate to protect fourth amendment rights.0 3 Although a
flagrancy test alone may not adequately protect fourth amendment
rights, excluding evidence obtained in a "flagrant" manner does supple-
ment the fourth amendment protection which the purposeful test pro-
vides.
In discussing the relevant factors in the attenuation analysis, the
Brown Court referred to voluntariness as a threshold requirement.
104
able cause to search an individual within a dwelling must be established independently of
probable cause to search the dwelling itself. The Court decided Ybarra after the occurrence
of the events in Rawlings.
I The Court's conclusion in Rawlings, that the police misconduct was not purposeful,
is supported by the Court's analysis of purpose in Brown. See note 49 supra.
See 422 U.S. at 610, 611 (Powell, J., .concurring in part).
"Id.
10 See 371 U.S. 471, 474 (1962); accord Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 592-93; note 35
supra.
101 See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
102 See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 138 (1954) (Clark, J., concurring).
10 367 U.S. 643, 661-66 (1961). In Mapp, Justice Black noted that the majority rejected
the confusing "shock the conscience" standard as a basis for making the exclusion decision.
Id. at 666. (Black, J., concurring).
"1' 422 U.S. at 604.
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The Brown Court, however, failed to elaborate on precisely what volun-
tariness entailed. Prior to Rawlings, the Court described voluntariness
in fruit of the poisonous tree cases as an act of free will sufficient to
purge the taint of the fourth amendment violation.' In Brown and
Dunaway, the Court held that the degree of voluntariness needed to
purge the taint of a fourth amendment violation is higher than the
degree of voluntariness needed to satisfy the fifth amendment prohibi-
tion against self-incrimination."' Brown and Dunaway, however, involved
purposeful and flagrant police misconduct.'
In contrast to Brown and Dunaway, the Rawlings Court concluded
that in a "congenial atmosphere," where police misconduct was neither
purposeful nor flagrant, a spontaneous statement made after Miranda
warnings was sufficiently voluntary to purge the taint of the fourth
amendment violation.' Apparently, the Rawlings Court concluded that
fifth amendment voluntariness is sufficient to purge the taint of a non-
purposeful or non-flagrant fourth amendment violation. Therefore, these
attenuation cases indicate that the Court has created a variable volun-
tariness standard which changes in direct correlation with the nature of
the fourth amendment violation.
In light of the Rawlings Court's reliance on voluntariness,"09 the
Brown Court's characterization of voluntariness as merely a threshold
question"0 is apparently incorrect. Rawlings indicates that voluntariness
is the ultimate issue in the attenuation analysis. Once a court determines
the applicable standard of voluntariness by examining the nature of the
fourth amendment violation, the dispositive question is whether the
defendant gave the statement in a sufficiently voluntary fashion to
satisfy the applicable voluntariness standard. Therefore, the other rele-
vant factors identified in Brown, such as time lapse and the presence of
intervening events,"' are important only insofar as they provide
evidence that the defendant made the statement voluntarily following
the fourth amendment violation."'
In both Brown and Dunaway the Court identified time lapse as one
of the relevant factors courts should consider in making an attenuation
determination."' In Wong Sun the Court relied on the time element to
1"5 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 486; see text accompanying notes 29-33
supra.
106 442 U.S. at 217-19; 422 U.S. at 603; see text accompanying notes 41-44, 58-61 supra.
... See 442 U.S. at 218; 422 U.S. at 605.
"1 100 S. Ct. at 2563; see text accompanying notes 75-82 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 77-80 supra.
"I See text accompanying note 46 supra.
Ill See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
112 See text accompanying notes 108-11 infra. (Rawlings treatment of Brown factors).
1 442 U.S. at 218; 422 U.S. at 604. The cases relied on by the Brown Court, in identify-
ing time lapse as a relevant factor, suggest that time lapse alone is insufficient to purge the
taint of a fourth amendment violation. 422 U.S. at 609; see note 47 supra.
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hold that Wong Sun's statement was voluntary."' The Court in Wong
Sun, however, did not find Wong Sun's statement sufficiently voluntary
solely because the statement occurred three days after Wong Sun's il-
legal arrest."5 Instead, the Court held that the statement was voluntary
because during that three day period the police had released Wong Sun
from custody and he had later returned of his own accord to the police
station for questioning. '16
The relationship of time lapse to voluntariness is apparently based
on the premise that the longer the time lapse, the higher the probability
that the defendant has made the statement voluntarily. As Justice
Stevens pointed out in his concurring opinion in Dunaway, however, a
long detention may represent a more serious exploitation of an illegal ar-
rest than a short detention."' Conversely, even a confession made im-
mediately after arrest may have been motivated by a pre-arrest event
and not by the illegal arrest."8 Although a long time lapse may, in some
cases, indicate voluntariness, or a short time lapse may suggest compul-
sion, neither conclusion is necessarily probable nor likely. Due to its
nebulous nature, the time lapse factor is unacceptable as a required ele-
ment in the attenuation analysis.
The presence of a significant intervening event is another relevant
factor the Court identified in Brown and Dunaway."' Wong Sun provides
an example of the relationship between an intervening event and the
voluntariness standard. After his illegal arrest, but prior to the challenged
statement, the agents released Wong Sun from custody."' Wong Sun,
acting of his own free will, returned to the police station several days
later to make the challenged statement."' Wong Sun's release from il-
legal detention broke the causal connection between the fourth amend-
... 371 U.S. at 491.
1.. See id.; text accompanying note 31 supra.
.. 371 U.S. at 491.
"1 442 U.S. at 220 (Stevens, J., concurring).
118 Id.
1 442 U.S. at 218; 422 U.S. at 604; See note 48 supra. The Brown Court relied solely on
Johnson v. Louisiana as an example of an intervening event. See note 48 supra. The time
lapse cases in Brown, however, provide additional insight into the intervening event re-
quirement. See note 47 supra. Both Owen and Maroney provide examples of intervening
events. Id In Owen police released the defendant from custody prior to his statement and
in Maroney the defendant made his confession after meeting with counsel and appearing
before an alderman. Id
One commentator has noted that the presence of intervening circumstances is perhaps
the only relevant factor for determining whether a statement is attenuated from a fourth
amendment violation. Miranda Warnings, supra note 6, at 243. The intervening event is par-
ticularly significant because a statement following a constitutional violation can be viewed
as presumptively tainted. Id The commentator noted that almost by definition, an interven-
ing event is required to break the connection or at least substantially weaken it. Id.
.' 371 U.S. at 491.
11 Id
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ment violation and the subsequent statement.22 The intervening event
of release from custody indicated that the statement Wong Sun even-
tually made was not the result of exploitation of the fourth amendment
violation." Although an intervening event such as release from illegal
detention does not prove that a subsequent statement was an act of free
will, such an event at least dec, eases the probability that the fourth
amendment violation directly caused the statement.
An intervening event may also serve to protect fourth amendment
rights in a manner other than that suggested by the voluntariness
analysis. The Brown Court cited Johnson v. Louisiana" as an example of
a case involving a significant intervening event."2 In Johnson, the defen-
dant argued that since his warrantless nighttime arrest was illegal, a
subsequent lineup identification was a forbidden fruit of the fourth
amendment violation. 26 The Supreme Court held, however, that since
police took Johnson before a magistrate prior to the lineup, the lineup
was not the fruit of the illegal arrest." The Court concluded that the
lineup was the result of the magisterial proceeding."
Johnson illustrates an exception to the general requirement that the
prosecution must demonstrate compliance with the applicable volun-
tariness standard in order to attenuate a tainted statement. A court's
classification of the magisterial proceeding as an intervening event is
not inconsistent with the general purpose of the fourth amendment ex-
clusionary rule.1 21 A magistrate's decision to keep a person in custody
creates a basis for holding the person which is independent from the
prior illegality."' If the police bring an illegally arrested individual
before a magistrate, the magistrate must order that the person be
released unless the prosecution proves a basis for continued detention."'
Under the Johnson analysis, courts would determine whether a state-
ment was tainted by examining the nature of the judicial proceeding
that took place between the illegal arrest and the later statement, not
the circumstances of the arrest itself. If the judicial proceeding provided
a valid, independent, basis for detaining the individual, the later state-
ment would be admissible.
The Supreme Court's new flexible rule for determining attenuation
has created more questions than it has answered. Even if the Court can
devise acceptable definitions for purpose and flagrancy, the degree of
12 See id.
123 See id.
u 406 U.S. 356, 365 (1972); see note 48 supra.
" 422 U.S. at 604.
1" 406 U.S: at 365.
127 Id
11Id-
11 See text accompanying note 6 supra.




voluntariness sufficient to purge the taint of a specific amount of pur-
poseful or flagrant misconduct will remain unclear. Since proof of suffi-
cient voluntariness appears to be the ultimate issue in attenuation
analysis, 2 the prosecution must know how to prove that the applicable
voluntariness standard is satisfied. Rawlings indicates that a non-
purposeful, non-flagrant fourth amendment violation has a low volun-
tariness standard which is satisfied by giving proper Miranda
warnings.1 3 Brown and Dunaway indicate that something more than
Miranda warnings is necessary to satisfy the voluntariness standard for
a purposeful, flagrant fourth amendment violation. 3 One of the impor-
tant unresolved questions is what is required to satisfy this volun-
tariness standard for purposeful, flagrant official misconduct. The Court
has described time lapse and intervening event as relevant factors1 35 but
the Court has failed to define the point at which these factors must be
shown in order to prove sufficient voluntariness to purge the taint of
purposeful, flagrant official misconduct.
In deciding constitutional questions, the Supreme Court has the
duty to set forth a rule to guide the lower courts.3 The Supreme Court's
rule in Rawlings tempers the potentially inflexible rule of Brown with a
totality of the circumstances approach and emphasizes the purpose and
flagrancy of police misconduct. The Rawlings rule may in effect be fio
rule at all. By creating an ambiguous test for attentuation,13 1 the
Supreme Court has given appellate courts almost no control over the
trial judge's decisions. The Supreme Court has left protection of an in-
dividual's fourth amendment rights solely to the trial judge with virtually
no guidance.
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Brown created a potential
problem of inflexibility," the rule possessed the advantage of protecting
fourth amendment rights and providing a reasonable measure of
guidance to the lower courts. The Rawlings decision, instead of building
upon the decision in Brown, destroys any semblance of a definite rule
and leaves individual fourth amendment rights at the mercy of trial
courts applying an ambiguous and ill-defined standard.1 39 If the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule is essential to the protection of an in-
"1 See text accompanying notes 109-110 supra.
'13 See 100 S. Ct. at 2256; text accompanying notes 62-82 supra.
13 See 442 U.S. 200; 422 U.S. 590; see text accompanying notes 42-51, 52-61 supra.
11 See 442 U.S. at 218; 422 U.S. at 603-04.
13 See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134 (1954). In Irvine the Supreme Court re-
jected defense counsel's argument that the exclusionary rule should apply to recordings ob-
tained by shocking violations of the defendant's fourth amendment rights. The Court noted
that drawing a distinction based on the nature of the fourth amendment violation would pro-
vide no meaningful constitutional guidance for state courts. Id. at 134.
' See text accompanying notes 86-90 supra.
13 See text accompanying notes 82-84 supra.
13 See text accompanying notes 86-90 supra.
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dividual's fourth amendment rights 4 then surely the test for exclusion
must be based on a more solid footing. The Supreme Court's decision in
Rawlings virtually guarantees that the courts will continue to grapple
with the admissibility of confessions following fourth amendment viola-
tions and that inconsistent and arbitrary decisions will result.
PAUL V. GERLACH
1I See note 6 supra (constitutional foundation of the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule).
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